Abstract-As computational clusters increase in size, their mean time to failure reduces drastically. Typically, checkpointing is used to minimize the loss of computation. Most checkpointing techniques, however, require central storage for storing checkpoints. This results in a bottleneck and severely limits the scalability of checkpointing, while also proving to be too expensive for dedicated checkpointing networks and storage systems. We propose a scalable replication-based MPI checkpointing facility. Our reference implementation is based on LAM/MPI; however, it is directly applicable to any MPI implementation. We extend the existing state of fault-tolerant MPI with asynchronous replication, eliminating the need for central or network storage. We evaluate centralized storage, a Sun-X4500-based solution, an EMC storage area network (SAN), and the Ibrix commercial parallel file system and show that they are not scalable, particularly after 64 CPUs. We demonstrate the low overhead of our checkpointing and replication scheme with the NAS Parallel Benchmarks and the High-Performance LINPACK benchmark with tests up to 256 nodes while demonstrating that checkpointing and replication can be achieved with a much lower overhead than that provided by current techniques. Finally, we show that the monetary cost of our solution is as low as 25 percent of that of a typical SAN/parallel-file-system-equipped storage system.
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INTRODUCTION
C OMPUTATIONAL clusters with hundreds or thousands of processors are fast-becoming ubiquitous in large-scale scientific computing. This is leading to a lower mean time to failure and forces the system software to deal with the possibility of arbitrary and unexpected node failures. Since MPI [1] provides no mechanism to recover from such failures, a single node failure will halt the execution of the entire computation. Thus, there exists great interest in the research community for a truly fault-tolerant MPI implementation.
Several groups have included checkpointing within various MPI implementations. MVAPICH2 now includes support for kernel-level checkpointing of InfiniBand MPI processes [2] . Sankaran et al. also describe a kernel-level checkpointing strategy within LAM/MPI [3] , [4] .
However, such implementations suffer from a major drawback: a reliance on a common network file system or dedicated checkpoint servers. We consider the reliance on network file systems, parallel file systems, and/or checkpoint servers to be a fundamental limitation of existing checkpoint systems. While storage area networks (SANs) and network file systems are certainly useful for general computation, writing checkpoints directly to the network storage incurs too great an overhead. Using dedicated checkpoint servers saturates the network links of a few machines, resulting in degraded performance. Even parallel file systems are easily saturated. In this paper, we focus specifically on reducing the checkpointing overhead by eliminating the reliance on shared storage. For completeness, we develop a user-level checkpointing solution within the LAM/MPI implementation. With this, initially described in our previous work [5] , we investigate several existing checkpoint storage solutions and demonstrate the low overhead of our proposed replication-based approach.
Because most checkpointing implementations shown in the literature consider clusters of inadequate size (typically fewer than 64 nodes, more often 8-16 nodes) or inadequately small benchmarks (class-B sizes of the NAS Parallel Benchmarks (NPB) [6] ), scalability issues regarding checkpointing are rarely considered. We specifically test the scalability of our implementation with class-D versions of the NPB suite. Further, we provide performance results for the High-Performance LINPACK (HPL) benchmark with up to 256 nodes and individual node memory footprints of up to 1 Gbyte each.
We show that the overhead of checkpointing to network storage, parallel file systems, or dedicated checkpoint servers is too severe for even moderately sized computational clusters. As such, we make the following contributions in this paper:
1. We propose and implement a checkpoint replication system that distributes the overhead of checkpointing evenly over all nodes participating in the computation. This significantly reduces the impact of heavy I/O on network storage. 2. We show that common existing strategies, including the use of dedicated checkpoint servers, SANs, and parallel file systems, are inadequate for even moderately sized computations. In addition, our solution is significantly less expensive, costing as little as 25 percent of the cost of a dedicated checkpointing SAN.
The remainder of this paper is outlined as follows: In Section 2, we provide a brief introduction to LAM/MPI and checkpointing. In Section 3, we describe the work related to this project. In Section 4, we discuss existing LAM/MPI checkpointing strategies. In Section 5, we compare existing checkpoint storage strategies and evaluate our proposed replication technique. Finally, in Section 6, we present our conclusions.
BACKGROUND 2.1 LAM/MPI
LAM/MPI [3] is a research implementation of the MPI-1.2 standard [1] with portions of the MPI-2 standard. LAM uses a layered software approach in its construction [7] . In doing so, various modules that tune LAM/MPI's runtime functionality are available to the programmer, including TCP, InfiniBand [8] , Myrinet [9] , and shared-memory communication.
The most commonly used module, however, is the TCP module, which provides basic TCP communication between LAM processes. A modification of this module, CRTCP, provides a bookmark mechanism for checkpointing libraries to ensure that a message channel is clear. LAM uses the CRTCP module for its built-in checkpointing capabilities.
More recently, checkpoint/restart support has been added to the Open MPI implementation [10] . Its implementation mirrors the kernel-level checkpoint/restart work already present in LAM/MPI. For our work, we chose LAM over Open MPI due to LAM's maturity and widespread academic use. However, this work is directly applicable to any MPI implementation as the replication work itself is implementation neutral.
Checkpointing Distributed Systems
Checkpointing is commonly performed at one of three levels: the kernel-level, the user-level, or the applicationlevel (others, including language level, hardware level, and virtual machine level, also exist). In kernel-level checkpointing, the checkpointer is implemented as a kernel module, making checkpointing fairly straightforward. However, the checkpoint itself is heavily reliant on the operating system (kernel version, process IDs, etc.). User-level checkpointing performs checkpointing at the library level, enabling a more portable checkpointing implementation at the cost of limited access to kernel-specific attributes (e.g., user-level checkpointers cannot restore process IDs).
At the highest level is application-level checkpointing where code is instrumented with checkpointing primitives. The advantage to this approach is that checkpoints can often be restored to arbitrary architectures. However, application-level checkpointers require access to a user's source code and do not support arbitrary checkpointing. Thus, a user's code must be instrumented with checkpoint locations (often inserted by hand by the programmer), after which a preprocessor adds in portable code to save the application's state. Thus, in order for a checkpoint to be taken, a checkpoint location must first be reached. Such is not the case with kernel-level or user-level strategies.
There are two major checkpointing/rollback recovery techniques: coordinated checkpointing and message logging. Coordinated checkpointing requires that all processes come to an agreement on a consistent state before a checkpoint is taken. Upon failure, all processes are rolled back to the most recent checkpoint/consistent state.
Message logging requires distributed systems to keep track of interprocess messages in order to bring a checkpoint up-to-date. Checkpoints can be taken in a non-coordinated manner, but the overhead of logging the interprocess messages can limit its utility. Elnozahy et al. provide a detailed survey of the various rollback recovery protocols that are in use today [11] .
Regardless of the level at which a checkpoint is taken (user level, kernel level, or application level) and the mechanism used to achieve a consistent state (message logging or coordination), a checkpoint must ultimately be stored such that it can be retrieved in the event of a node failure. Checkpoints may be stored in memory or directly to disk. The most common strategy is to store checkpoints directly to stable storage such as a SAN or parallel file system. This has advantages in terms of simplicity and ease of implementation but largely ignores the overhead created by such an approach. Our focus in this article is to reduce the overhead of checkpointing through the use of local disk replication.
RELATED WORK
Checkpointing at both the user level and kernel level has been extensively studied [12] , [13] , [14] . The official LAM/ MPI implementation includes support for checkpointing using the Berkeley Linux Checkpoint/Restart (BLCR) kernellevel checkpointing library [4] . An implementation by Zhang et al. duplicates the functionality of LAM's checkpointing but implements the checkpointing at the user level [15] . As described earlier, Open MPI also includes support for LAM-like BLCR checkpointing [10] . All current LAM checkpointing implementations rely on network storage.
Scheduling-based approaches have been used to help alleviate the impact of saving checkpoints to centralized storage. Wang et al. have implemented pause/restart functionality in LAM [16] that moves checkpoint data to centralized storage in smaller groups. However, their results are limited to 16 nodes, making the scalability of their solution unknown. Similarly, MPICH-GM, a Myrinetspecific implementation of MPICH, has been extended by Jung et al. to support user-level checkpointing [17] . They show that the overhead of SAN-based checkpoint storage may be partially mitigated by first storing checkpoints locally before serializing their transfer to a SAN. We repeat and compare against their solution in Section 5.5.
Gao et al. demonstrate a kernel-level checkpointing scheme for InfiniBand on MVAPICH2 that is based on the BLCR kernel module [2] , [40] . To help improve the performance of checkpointing, particularly the checkpointing delay due to shared storage, they propose a group-based checkpointing solution that divides the MPI processes into multiple (smaller) checkpointing groups. Each group checkpoints individually in an effort to reduce the checkpointing overhead. In order to achieve low overhead, however, their solution requires that noncheckpointing groups make computational progress during other groups' checkpoints. This requires that the MPI processes be divided into groups according to their communication patterns, which in turn requires information from the user. Further, their tests are limited to 32 nodes, making the scalability of their system unknown.
Using Charm++ [18] and Adaptive-MPI [19] , Chakravorty et al. add fault tolerance via task migration to the Adaptive-MPI system [20] , [21] . Their system relies on processor virtualization to achieve migration transparency. Zheng et al. discuss a minimal replication strategy within Charm++ to save each checkpoint to two "buddy" processors [22] .
Coding strategies have recently reappeared as a common technique for providing fault tolerance to checkpoint data. While RAID-like coding strategies have been previously described for parallel systems [23] , [24] , the massive amounts of data generated in today's checkpoints are necessitating a reexamination of such techniques. Plank investigated the performance implications of centralized storage with the use of RAID-like checkpointing [23] . His work, however, does not account for the use of SANs or parallel file systems but instead relies on a traditional NFS server for checkpoint storage. Ren et al. use information dispersal algorithms along with checkpoint storage repositories in a fine-grained cycle sharing system [26] . Chen et al. similarly discuss a coding approach to checkpoint storage in FT-MPI that requires users to insert the coding scheme directly into their self-written checkpointing code [27] .
Nath et al. describe a content addressable storage (CAS)-based solution that may be used to reduce the impact of checkpointing on storage systems (either shared or local storage). Their approach reduces or eliminates duplication of data within the CAS file system by storing common data once and referencing it as needed [28] . Any common data that exists from one checkpoint period to the next can be stored once, thereby reducing the disk IO and disk space consumed. However, this approach introduces a single point of failure in that corruption of highly common data chunks may result in unreadable checkpoints spanning multiple checkpoint periods. Nath et al. suggest that a replication system may be used to alleviate this single point of failure [28] .
Our work differs from the previous work in checkpoint storage in that we handle checkpoint redundancy for added resiliency in the presence of multiple simultaneous node failures. Our checkpointing solution does not rely on the existence of network storage for checkpointing. This allows for improved scalability and also shorter checkpoint intervals (where desired). This work may be used in conjunction with a coding or CAS-based approach, as both may decrease the size of checkpoint fragments while providing fault tolerance. Combining these strategies with checkpoint replication may yield further improvements over the replication-only results we present in this article. However, the overhead of encoding and decoding large checkpoints is a concern that we are currently investigating.
LAM/MPI CHECKPOINTING
We are not the first group to implement checkpointing within the LAM/MPI system. Three others [4] , [15] , [16] have added basic checkpoint/restart support. Because of the previous work in LAM/MPI checkpointing, the basic checkpointing/restart building blocks were already present within LAM's source code. This provided an ideal environment for testing our replication strategy. We begin with a brief overview of checkpointing with LAM/MPI. Sankaran et al. first added checkpointing support within the LAM system [4] by implementing a lightweight coordinated blocking module to replace LAM's existing TCP module. The protocol begins when mpirun instructs each LAM daemon (lamd) to checkpoint its MPI processes. When a checkpoint signal is delivered to an MPI process, each process exchanges bookmark information with all other MPI processes. These bookmarks contain the number of bytes sent to/received from every other MPI process. With this information, any in-flight messages can be waited on and received before the checkpoint occurs.
After quiescing the network channels, the MPI library is locked, and a checkpointing thread assumes control. The BLCR library is used as a kernel-level checkpointing engine [13] . Each process checkpoints itself using BLCR (including mpirun), and the computation resumes.
When a node fails, the user restarts the checkpointed mpirun, which automatically restarts the application using an application schema to maintain the original topology. The MPI library is then reinitialized, and the computation resumes.
Zhang et al. describe a user-level checkpointing solution that is also implemented within LAM [15] . Their checkpointer (libcsm) is signal based rather than thread based. Otherwise, their implementation is identical to that of Sankaran et al.'s.
A problem with the above solutions is that both require identical restart topologies. If, for example, a node fails, the system cannot restart by remapping checkpoints to existing nodes. Instead, a new node must be inserted into the cluster to force the restart topology into consistency with the original topology. This requires the existence of spare nodes that can be allocated to the computation to replace failed nodes. If no spare nodes are available, the computation cannot be restarted.
Two previous groups have attempted to solve the problem of migrating LAM checkpoint images. Cao et al. [29] propose a migration scheme based on the BLCR work [4] by Sankaran et al. Their technique toward migrating LAM checkpoints requires a tool to parse through the binary checkpoint images, find the MPI process location information, and update the node IDs.
Wang et al. propose a pause/migrate solution where spare nodes are used for migration purposes when a LAM daemon discovers an unresponsive node [16] . Upon detecting a failure, their system migrates the failed processes via a network file system to the replacement nodes before continuing the computation. However, the scalability of their solution is not yet known as their results were limited to 16 nodes.
In Fig. 1 , we provide a brief sketch of the LAM/MPI checkpoint/restart mechanism, including our enhancements. Our checkpointing solution uses the same coordinated blocking approach as the existing techniques described above. To perform the checkpointing, we integrate the Ckpt user-level checkpointer [30] . Unlike previous solutions, we allow for arbitrary restart topologies without relying on any shared storage or checkpoint parsing.
The majority of Fig. 1 is the same basic checkpoint strategy that is used by Sankaran et al. [4] . Where our implementation differs is in the "restart base" and "GPS coordinate update" portions of Fig. 1 , where processspecific data is updated before continuation (noted by the box). The primary differences (compared to LAM's BLCR checkpoint implementation) are that user-level checkpointing does not provide the same restart capabilities of kernellevel checkpointing. For example, process IDs are restored when using a kernel-level checkpointer such as BLCR [13] but cannot be restored at the user level. Thus, our user-level checkpointing solution requires a more in-depth restart procedure that both restores the computation and resynchronizes the process-specific attributes that would otherwise be handled by the kernel-level checkpointing library.
In the "restart base" portion of Fig. 1 , we update all process-specific information that has changed due to a restart. This includes updating process IDs, environment variables, and restarting messaging channels. In order to support process migration, we added a phase to LAM's restart sequence. We depict this as "update GPS coordinates." LAM uses an internal GPS-like data structure ( Fig. 2) to maintain vital identification for each MPI process. The GPS structure defines location-specific information for each MPI process. It provides a mechanism to easily determine the node on which a process is executing, as well as a process' rank within its node. Thus, for every process in the MPI world, there exists a GPS entry, and each process caches a local copy of the entire GPS array. A migration that varies the MPI topology will alter elements of the GPS array as processes are assigned to alternate nodes (the gps_node field in Fig. 2 ). Our strategy is to mimic an MPI_Init upon restart in order to trigger a GPS cache update from mpirun. This facilitates the arbitrary migration of MPI processes without relying on a tool to manually parse the checkpoints. It further simplifies the restarting of messaging channels as it allows us to use LAM's existing message channel initialization code to start/restart its underlying network connections.
CHECKPOINT STORAGE, RESILIENCE, AND PERFORMANCE
In order to enhance the resiliency of checkpointing while simultaneously reducing its overhead, we include data replication. While not typically stated explicitly, nearly all checkpoint/restart methods rely on the existence of network storage that is accessible to the entire cluster. Such strategies suffer from two major drawbacks in that they create a single point of failure and also incur excessive overhead when compared to checkpointing to local disks. Moreover, a cluster that utilizes a network file systembased checkpoint/restart mechanism may sit idle should the file system experience a failure. This not only leads to wasteful downtime but also may lead to lost data should the computation fail without the ability to checkpoint. However, even with fault-tolerant network storage, simply writing large amounts of data to such storage represents an unnecessary overhead to the application. To help mitigate this overhead, we examine two replication strategies in the sections to follow: a dedicated server technique and a distributed replication strategy.
We acknowledge that arguments can be made in support of the use of SANs or parallel file systems for the storage of checkpoints. The most powerful supercomputers such as the IBM Blue Gene have no per-node local storage. Instead, parallel file systems are used for persistent data storage in order to reduce the number of node failures due to disk failures. However, the majority of today's computational clusters already posses some form of local storage. Our goal is to better utilize such storage for fault tolerance. Further, as supercomputing becomes more data intensive, the need for local storage, even in the largest supercomputers, is becoming even more necessary [31] . With active work in the search and analysis of petabytes of data, high-speed, local, and "intelligent" disks are becoming mandatory [32] . We would argue that the next generation of supercomputers must contain some form of high-speed local storage, despite its potential shortcomings.
Our implementation is built on top of TCP using Ethernet. Other networking fabrics could be used, as evidenced by the previous work in InfiniBand and Myrinet. However, our goal was to target the most widely used cluster interconnect in an effort to be more widely applicable. Accordingly, we chose Gigabit Ethernet due to its popularity within the Top500 supercomputer list [33] .
We evaluate both centralized server and network storage-based techniques and compare them against our proposed replication strategy using the SP, LU, and BT benchmarks from the NPB suite [6] and the HPL [34] benchmark. The remaining benchmarks within the NPB suite represent synthetic computational kernels, rather than mini-applications. We limited our NPB benchmarking focus to the mini-applications as we found them to be more representative of typical computational workloads. The tests were performed with a single MPI process per node. To measure the performance of our checkpointing implementation and replication using the NPB tests, we used exclusively "Class-D" benchmarks. For the HPL benchmark, we selected a matrix with a problem size of 53,000. These configurations resulted in checkpoint sizes and runtimes that are listed in Table 1 , with all tests conducted on a single set of 64 nodes. Later, in Section 5.5, we test our solution for scalability.
These tests were performed using a Wayne State University cluster consisting of 92 dual 2.66-GHz Pentium IV Xeon processors with 2.5-Gbyte RAM, a 10,000-RPM Ultra SCSI hard disk, and Fast Ethernet. A 36-Tbyte Sun X4500 storage unit was also used for the network storage tests. The 92-node cluster accesses the X4500 via a single gigabit fiber connection. Tests are performed on 64 nodes of the 92-node cluster, with checkpoints taken at intervals ranging from 4 minutes to 16 minutes. We utilize short checkpointing frequencies in order to exaggerate the impact of our checkpoint strategy on the benchmarks. In a production environment, checkpoints would be taken at intervals of several hours or more. By exaggerating the checkpoint intervals, we are able to gain a more accurate sense of the worst case overheads present in our system.
As a baseline, we compare storage to a dedicated server, storage to the X4500, and replication storage techniques against the checkpoint data shown in Fig. 3 . Here, we show the result of periodically checkpointing the NPBs, as well as the HPL benchmark, along with a breakdown of the time taken to perform a single checkpoint. Each node stores its checkpoints directly to its own local disk. This is done in order to gain a sense of the overhead incurred from checkpointing without stable storage of any kind.
In Fig. 3a , we break the checkpointing overhead down by coordination time, memory write time, and continue time. The coordination phase includes the time needed to quiesce the network channels/exchange bookmarks (see Section 4). The memory write time consists of the time needed to checkpoint the entire memory footprint of a single process and write it to a local disk. Finally, the continue phase includes the time needed to synchronize and resume the computation. On occasion, particularly with large memory footprints, the continue phase can seem disproportionately long. This is due to some nodes' slower checkpoint/file writing performance, forcing the faster nodes to wait. As we show in Fig. 3a , this is the case with the BT benchmark. Such waiting ultimately drives up the continue-phase timings, as they are simply an average of all nodes' waiting time. We note carefully that one should not conclude that the continue phase dominates the overhead in such cases. Instead, it is more accurately interpreted as a measure of the slowest nodes' checkpoint writing performance.
Thus, the time required to checkpoint the entire system is largely dependent on the time needed to write the memory footprint of the individual nodes. Writing the checkpoint file to the disk represents the single largest time in the entire checkpoint process and dwarfs the coordination phase. As the memory footprint of an application grows, so too does the time needed to checkpoint. This can also impact the time needed to perform the continue barrier as faster nodes are forced to wait for slower nodes to write their checkpoints to the disk.
In Fig. 3b , we provide the total overheads for all benchmarks at 4, 8, and 16-minute checkpointing intervals. Our user-level checkpointing implementation shows very little overhead even when checkpointing the 1.02-Gbyte BT benchmark at 4-minute intervals. Indeed, none of the benchmarks exhibit an overhead of more than 8 percent despite being checkpointed up to 17 times (in the case of BT). As the checkpointing frequency is reduced to 8 and 16 minutes, the overhead drops to less than 2 percent in all cases. The major source of the overhead of our checkpointing scheme lies in the time taken in writing the checkpoint images to the local file system.
Dedicated Checkpoint Servers versus
Checkpointing to Network Storage
The two most common checkpoint storage techniques presented in the literature are the use of dedicated server(s) [35] and storing checkpoints directly to network storage [2] , [4] . We begin our evaluation with a comparison of these two strategies.
For our dedicated checkpoint server implementation, we use the LAM daemons (lamd) to move checkpoints from individual nodes to a dedicated checkpoint server. Each lamd was extended with an additional daemon that is used to both collect checkpoint information from each of its MPI processes and asynchronously propagate the data to the dedicated server. We have also extended mpirun to include a checkpointing daemon responsible for scheduling and receiving checkpoints.
In Fig. 4 , we show the overhead of checkpointing with the added cost of streaming the checkpoints to a centralized server or storing the checkpoints to the Sun X4500. Only one checkpoint is taken for both the dedicated checkpoint server and the X4500. As Fig. 4 shows, the overhead of storing checkpoints to the X4500 far outperforms that of streaming the checkpoints to a centralized server. Indeed, the overhead of streaming the largest checkpoints, BT, to a dedicated server result in an overhead of 113.5 percent. Storing checkpoints directly to the X4500, however, results in an overhead of only 16.62 percent. This is to be expected, given that the single dedicated server is collecting checkpoints over a Fast Ethernet connection.
However, we can also see that as the size of the checkpoint decreases, so too does the overhead incurred by streaming all checkpoints to a centralized server. A single checkpoint incurs an overhead of 37 percent, 56 percent, and 68 percent for the LU, SP, and HPL benchmarks, respectively. Similar reductions are seen when saving checkpoints directly to the X4500, resulting in overheads of 7.6 percent, 7.4 percent, and 7.8 percent for LU, SP, and HPL. We note that the overhead incurred by HPL is higher than both SP and LU due to its shorter runtime and larger checkpoints. With a runtime that approximates LU and checkpoint sizes approximating SP, the HPL benchmark spends proportionally more time checkpointing than either LU or SP, hence the slightly higher overhead.
Nevertheless, the X4500-based solution shows a distinct advantage over centralized storage, as would be expected for moderately sized clusters. To help mitigate the bottleneck of a centralized server, techniques using multiple checkpoint servers have been proposed [35] . However, their efficacy in the presence of large checkpoint files has not been demonstrated in the literature (NPB class-B results are shown). Furthermore, if each checkpoint server is collecting data from a distinct set of nodes, as Coti et al. imply [35] , the computation will not be resilient to failed checkpoint servers. Finally, as we show in Fig. 4 , dedicated server strategies simply do not scale, particularly at cluster sizes of 64 nodes. Thus, a solution that uses dedicated servers would require a large number of servers to accommodate large computations.
Checkpoint Replication
To address the scalability issues shown in Section 5.1, we implemented an asynchronous replication strategy that distributes the checkpoint/replication overhead over all nodes participating in the computation. Again, we extended LAM's lamds. This time, we used a peer-to-peer strategy between each lamd to replicate checkpoints to multiple nodes. This addresses both the resiliency of checkpoints to node failure and the bottlenecks incurred by transferring data to dedicated servers.
A variety of replication strategies have been used in peerto-peer systems. Typically, such strategies must take into account the relative popularity of individual files within the network in order to ascertain the optimal replication strategy. Common techniques include the square-root, proportional, and uniform distributions [36] . While the uniform distribution is not often used within peer-to-peer networks, because it does not account for a file's query probability, our checkpoint/restart system relies on the availability of each checkpoint within the network. Thus, each checkpoint has an equal query probability/popularity, and we feel that a uniform distribution is justified for this specific case.
We opted to distribute the checkpoints pseudorandomly in order to provide a higher resilience to network failures. For example, a solution that replicates to a node's nearest (or farthest) neighbors may fail in the presence of a switch failure. A strategy that forces nodes to replicate to their farthest neighbors may also exhibit lower performance in the presence of inadequate network bisection bandwidth. Further, nodes may not fail independently and instead may cause the failure of additional nodes within their local vicinity. Thus, we use random replication in order to probabilistically spread checkpoints onto multiple switches in multiple locations.
To ensure an even distribution of checkpoints throughout the MPI world, we extended the lamboot command with a parameter representing the degree of replication (the number of replicas). lamboot is responsible for computing and informing each lamd of its replicas.
Random Node Selection
Intuitively, the generation of random locations for replica placement is quite simple. The MPI computation is described by a set of nodes, with one or more computation processes executing per node. For each node there is a single lamd process per user, independent of the number of MPI processes executing on any particular node. Since replication is provided at the node level and not at the MPI process level, the computation can be described strictly in terms of the number of nodes. Then, N ¼ node 0 ; node 1 ; . . . ; node nÀ1 is the set of nodes participating in a user's MPI computation, and r is the number of replicas, decided by the user.
The goal is to randomly generate r replicas per node, subject to the following constraints:
1. A node should not replicate to itself. 2. A node should replicate to exactly r nodes, each of which may only store r replicas. 3. Each of a node's r replicas should be unique. Constraints 1 and 3 are quite straightforward. Constraint 2, however, represents the subtle difference between our balanced replication approach and an approach that simply utilizes multiple checkpoint repositories. Without constraint 2, an imbalance can occur within the replica storage. An extreme, though unlikely, consequence of this would be one in which many nodes are assigned the same replicas, thereby overly burdening a few nodes that act as de facto checkpoint servers. Our approach eliminates this possibility.
Perhaps the most obvious solution is to proceed in order from node 0 through node nÀ1 and randomly generate replicas per the above constraints. In practice, however, this will not work due to the gradual narrowing of the replica candidates as the algorithm proceeds. Eventually, one is left with only a few replica candidates, none of which satisfy the constraints.
Algorithm 1. Compute random replica placements.
Input: Integer r, the number of replicas Input: Integer n, the number of nodes Output: Replica array, Replicas½0; . . . ; n À 1½0; . . . ; r À 1 1: for all i such that 0 i < n do 2: Preload node i's replicas with i 3: end for 4: Circular shift each column (j index) of Replicas by column index À 1 5: for all i such that 0 i < n do 6: for all j such that 0 j < r do 7:
z ¼ random node, s.t. 0 z < n 9:
v ¼ Replicas½z½j 10:
until z 6 ¼ i 11:
if v 6 ¼ i and Replicas½i½j 6 ¼ z then 12:
valid replica ¼ 1
13:
for all k such that 0 k < r do 14:
if In Algorithm 1, we describe our solution to the problem of random node selection. Similar work has been studied in the context of expander graphs [37] . The key to our algorithm is to begin with an initial state that satisfies the above replica constraints and incrementally refines the replica choices through swapping. We achieve an initial state in lines 1-4. The only requirement of the circular shift referenced on line 4 is that the final state of replicas should be valid according to the constraints. This means that each column (j index in Algorithm 1) should be circular shifted such that no two rows (i index) contains duplicate replicas and no row should be assigned itself (if there are n nodes, one should not shift by either 0 or n). The shift can be random or could be as simple as rotating the jth column by j AE 1.
In Figs. 5 and 6, we provide an example of an initial state and a post-shift state, assuming 64 nodes with three replicas. Clearly, rotating the columns as shown in Fig. 6 is far from ideal. Nevertheless, it is a valid assignment that provides an adequate initial state. Once the initial state is achieved, the algorithm proceeds through each node and each replica and swaps replicas with randomly chosen nodes.
Because we began the swapping with a valid initial state, we need only maintain the constraints while introducing an element of randomness into the replica generation. Two nodes may swap replicas as long as neither node already contains a copy of their potential replicas and provided that the swap would not result in either node replicating to itself.
In lines 7-10, we generate the candidate node that may later be used for swapping. The only constraint that is enforced is that z, the random node, should not be i. That is, node i should not attempt to swap with itself. At the end of the repeat-until loop, z will contain the node that node i may swap with, and v contains the actual replica that may be swapped.
Once a valid replica candidate has been generated, we simply check to ensure that swapping would maintain a valid state. In line 11, we confirm that the exchange would not result in self-replication. That is, v, the actual replica to be swapped, should not be i and vice versa. In lines 13-16, we confirm that for both node i and the candidate node, the swap would not result in a duplicate replica being added to either node's replica set. Finally, in lines 18-21, we perform the actual replica swap. We provide an example of a possible final replica assignment for a 64-node cluster with three replicas in Fig. 7 . Fig. 8 shows the results of distributing one and two replicas of both NPB and HPL throughout the cluster. As can be seen, the overhead of a single checkpoint in Fig. 8a is substantially lower than that of either the centralized server or X4500, shown previously in Fig. 4 . In each case, we are able to reduce the overhead of a single checkpoint to below 2 percent, where the overhead of a single checkpoint is computed as overhead num checkpoints for the 8-minute checkpoint interval. We observe that even at 8-minute checkpointing intervals, the aggregate overhead typically remains below 10 percent, with only the BT benchmark exhibiting a higher overhead of 12.6 percent. After doubling the checkpointing interval to 16 minutes, the overhead reduces to 2.9 percent to 4.3 percent for all benchmarks.
Basic Replication Overhead
To address the resiliency of checkpoint replication in the presence of node failure we insert multiple checkpoint replicas into the system. In Fig. 8b , we compare the overheads of distributing two replicas of each checkpoint. As we would expect, the overhead incurred is proportional to the size of the checkpoint that is distributed. For smaller checkpoints such as LU, distributing the two replicas represents minimal overhead. As the size of the checkpoint increases, however, so too does the overhead. The BT data in Fig. 8b clearly exhibits much higher overall overhead than the single replica data in Fig. 8a . Even so, the overhead per checkpoint remains quite low as evidenced by BT's single checkpoint overhead of 2.86 percent. Once the checkpointing interval increases to 16 minutes, the overall overheads drop to less than 10 percent.
Restarting/Recovering from Failure
One potential caveat to the use of distributed local storage/ replication for checkpointing lies in the restart of failed computations. Storing checkpoints to a SAN or other central repository makes restarting and rebalancing computation quite straightforward. Indeed, one can simply restart the failed computation in a similar manner as running a standard MPI application. Since all checkpoints are stored in a single place, mpirun can easily find and start any checkpoint on any node, provided that the checkpoints are already migrateable.
Restarting a computation that uses local storage, however, is slightly more involved. We use the fact that all lamds are allocated their replicas at the lamboot stage. Therefore, all checkpoints and their replica locations are known a priori. At start-up, the lamboot command simply records all replica locations and writes them to a file (replica schema). One would expect even the largest cluster's replica schema to total less than several megabytes, with typical clusters averaging less than 100 Kbytes. As such, this file can be replicated like any other checkpoint. For added resiliency, the replica schema may be broadcast to all nodes in the computation.
When restarting a failed computation due to node failure, mpirun uses the replica placement data along with the current machine file to remap the computation onto existing nodes. First, all surviving nodes are assigned their own checkpoints to restart. If the computation is restarted on a subset of the original nodes, then any outstanding checkpoints are remapped to a previous replica location. If additional replacement nodes are available, mpirun initializes a parallel file transfer to copy unclaimed checkpoints to the new node(s).
In Fig. 9 , we present the results of restarting the HPL benchmark in the presence of zero, four, and eight failures, where zero failure indicates a simple restart with no missing nodes. We compare our mapped restart to the typical strategy of restarting from a shared storage device. As Fig. 9 shows, our local storage strategy exhibits clear benefits to restarting computations, reducing the X4500-based restart times from 4.4 minutes to 2.4 seconds with eight failures.
Both solutions exhibit nearly constant restart times regardless of the number of failures. This is to be expected, as oversubscribing computations to nodes incurs overhead primarily in runtime rather than start-up time, whereas in restarts, the overhead is due to lack of bandwidth. Nevertheless, we see a slight increase in start-up times, with the X4500 restart times increasing from 243.4 seconds to 265.7 seconds, and the local storage restart times increasing from 2.0 seconds to 2.4 seconds as additional failures are added.
The Degree of Replication
While the replication strategy that we have described has clear advantages in terms of reducing the overhead on a running application, an important question that remains is the number of replicas necessary to achieve a high probability of restart. To help answer this question, we developed a simulator capable of replicating node failures, given inputs of the network size and the number of replicas. Table 2 lists the number of failures that our replication scheme will probabilistically tolerate, given one to four replicas. We provide failure data for both the number of replicas and the desired probability of a successful restart up to 99.9 percent. Our goal with Table 2 is not to demonstrate that our system is capable of surviving a node failure with two or more replicas but rather to show the number of simultaneous node failures that our replication system is capable of surviving, for example, in the case of a switch failure.
In Table 2 , we can see that our replication strategy enables a high probability of restart with seemingly few replicas needed in the system. With 2,048 processors, for example, we estimate that 112 simultaneous failures could occur while maintaining at least a 99.9 percent probability of successful restart and requiring only four replicas of each checkpoint. This amounts to 5.5 percent of the total cluster. With five or six replicas (not shown), our system can tolerate failures of 9.1 percent and 12.6 percent of the cluster while still maintaining a 99.9 percent probability of restart. 
Scalability Studies
To demonstrate scalability, we also tested our implementation with up to 256 nodes on a cluster managed by the University at Buffalo's Center for Computational Research. The 1,600 nodes each consist of 3.0/3.2 GHz Intel Xeon processors, with two processors per node, gigabit ethernet, and Myrinet 2G network interfaces. Storage consists of a 30-Tbyte EMC Clariion CX700 SAN, and a high performance commercial Ibrix parallel file system. Twenty-one active Ibrix segment servers are in use and connect to the existing EMC SAN. The Ethernet network has a 44-Gbit theoretical bisection bandwidth. The data mover associated with the SAN's scratch file system used in our benchmarks has a maximum sustained bandwidth of 260 Mbytes/s. Despite the cluster's Myrinet network, we chose to implement our results using Gigabit Ethernet, due to its prevalence in the Top500 list [33] . Similar strategies could be employed for both Myrinet and InfiniBand, and we would expect performance improvements in those cases.
Because the checkpointing engine, Ckpt [30] , is only 32 bits, while the University at Buffalo's Xeon processors are each 64 bits, we simulated the mechanics of checkpointing with an artificial 1-Gbyte file that is created and written to the local disk at each checkpoint interval. Aside from this, the remaining portions of our checkpointing system remain intact (coordination, continue, file writing, and replication). Tests on all shared storage devices (EMC SAN and Ibrix parallel file system) were performed multiple times to ensure that spikes in resource usage could be taken into account while also being performed at non-peak times to minimize the impact of cluster users on the shared storage. We focus our remaining tests on the HPL benchmark as its runtime is easily adjusted to maintain a reasonable amount of computation. The NPB benchmarks simply execute too quickly on clusters of 128 and 256 nodes and do not demonstrate realistic overheads.
In Fig. 10 , we demonstrate the impact of our replication scheme. Each set of nodes (64, 128, and 256) operates on a unique data set to maintain a runtime of approximately 1,000 seconds. The individual figures in Fig. 10 all represent the percent overhead of the HPL benchmark at each cluster size for checkpointing intervals of 8 and 16 minutes (two checkpoints and one checkpoint, respectively). In Fig. 10a , we can see that the cost of a single replica is quite low, exhibiting overheads of less than 5 percent at 16-minute checkpointing intervals. By halving the checkpointing interval to 8 minutes, we incur approximately twice the overhead at 9.4 percent for 256 nodes. Similar single-checkpoint results can be seen at two, three, and four replicas with only a minimal increase in overhead for each replica. However, by halving the checkpointing interval to 8 minutes, we incur a slight increase in overhead as replicas are added, with 256 nodes resulting in an overhead of approximately 2.5 times the cost of a single checkpoint. This is due largely to the networking overhead added by replication, resulting in decreased bandwidth for the running application.
For comparison, we also present the overhead of checkpointing to the EMC SAN and Ibrix parallel file system in Fig. 11 . Large-scale evaluation of the centralized server technique was not possible due to the limited disk capacity of the compute nodes. As can be seen, the overhead of checkpointing directly to a SAN not only dwarfs that of our distributed replication strategy but also limits the scalability for large clusters. At 256 nodes, for example, a single checkpoint to the EMC SAN results in an overhead of nearly 200 percent, while our checkpoint/ replication strategy with four replicas results in an overhead of only 7.1 percent. This suggests that for today's large-scale clusters, SAN-based checkpointing is not currently a viable solution.
The Ibrix file system, while scaling much better than the EMC SAN, is quickly overwhelmed as the ratio of compute nodes to IO/segment servers increases. At 64 nodes, the 21 segment servers are able to easily accommodate the checkpoint data with minimal overhead (11.9 percent for Ibrix versus 2.3 percent with four replicas at 16-minute intervals). However, as the ratio of compute nodes to segment servers increases to 6 : 1 and 12 : 1 for 128 and 256 nodes, the overhead increases dramatically. Indeed, the overhead of saving checkpoints to the Ibrix parallel file systems for cluster sizes of 128 and 256 nodes is 41.8 percent and 59.8 percent, respectively.
Jung et al. suggest a serialized approach to reducing the overhead of storing checkpoints to shared devices such as a SAN [17] . Their strategy is to first checkpoint to local storage and then copy the checkpoints to a SAN. We reproduced this experiment, comparing a single serialized checkpoint against a single four-replica checkpoint. The results, shown in Fig. 12 , demonstrate that serializing the transfer of checkpoints to shared storage closely matches our HPL runtimes. However, one must also consider the time needed to complete a checkpoint, shown in the stacked bar in Fig. 12 . Here, we see that the consequence of the serialization is drastically increased checkpointing times, ranging from 1,700 seconds at 64 nodes to nearly 5,300 seconds at 256 nodes. This represents a checkpoint time of five times the benchmark time. Our replication strategy, however, exhibits nearly constant checkpoint times of approximately 250 seconds for four replicas, which is well within the benchmark times.
The result of the increased checkpointing time is that applications are effectively limited to a checkpointing interval proportional to the number of nodes participating in the checkpoint. In Fig. 12 , we can see that a 256-node computation, each writing 1-Gbyte checkpoints, may checkpoint at a frequency of approximately 90 minutes. Increasing the size of checkpoints or the number of nodes will increase the checkpointing time commensurately. Of course, the checkpointing time may be reduced somewhat by increasing the copy rate to network storage; however, the consequence is increased overhead on the application.
In order to further reduce the replication overhead while maintaining low checkpoint writing/replication times, we include the ability for an MPI application to utilize additional networks to carry checkpoint data. While not mandatory, separating the replica communication from the application's communication may substantially reduce the impact of replication on the application. Clusters that already utilize multiple networks may simply exchange checkpoint replicas using a secondary network to further reduce overheads for no additional cost. We chose to use our Myrinet network, with IP over Myrinet (IPoM), for replication. Checkpoints could instead be carried by the Ethernet network with the main application operating over Myrinet; however, we chose to replicate over the Myrinet network to facilitate comparison with our existing singlenetwork Ethernet tests. A similar strategy could be used to enable checkpoints over an InfiniBand network.
In Fig. 13 , we show the results of one to four replicas at 256 nodes. As the figure shows, the use of additional networks to offload checkpoint replication can lead to substantial reductions in overhead. Our results show an average improvement of 40 percent at 8-minute checkpointing intervals and 50 percent at 16-minute checkpointing intervals when comparing the 256-node overhead in Fig. 10 . We note that while utilizing a secondary network improves the performance of our replication scheme, it cannot fully eliminate all networking overhead. Ultimately, each node must individually transmit and receive all checkpoint data (as well as write the replicas to disk). Processing such data leads to a small amount of overhead for increasing amounts of data.
Comparing the Costs of SAN, PFS, and Local Storage
Some have argued that contention for SAN resources could be mitigated through the use of a checkpoint backplane with a dedicated SAN/parallel file system [38] . However, a SAN solution capable of handling the massive amounts of data generated by tomorrow's supercomputers would simply cost too much. We consider two commercial SAN-based systems: one is a mid-range solution that includes the cost of a commercial parallel file system, and the second is considered a high-end system that, due to incompatibilities, does not utilize a parallel file system. Neither system includes the cost of IO servers, host bus adapters (HBAs), or a backup system, and both include heavy academic discounts for the hardware.
To equip a similar 1,000-node computational cluster with up to 1 Tbyte of usable local storage for checkpointing could be accomplished at a cost of only $644 per node. This includes the cost of two 1-Tbyte (SATA-II 7,200-RPM) hard disks 1 ($255 each) and a hardware RAID-1 controller 2 ($134). The cost drops to only $334 per node if 500-Gbyte hard disks 3 are used instead ($100 each). Comparing the usable storage of the local storage versus SAN backplane solutions, we are left with 500 Tbytes of local storage if 500-Gbyte hard disks are used and 1 Pbyte of usable storage if 1-Tbyte hard disks are used instead. Thus, local storage/replication solution can be purchased for only 25-58 percent of the SAN backplane cost, with a lower checkpointing overhead.
Of course, it should be noted that the addition of hard disks may increase the failure rate of an individual node. This may be due to an increase in heat produced by nodes, which may result in a strain on the cooling capabilities of the data center. However, whether the disks used for checkpointing are stored locally at each node or centrally in a SAN, they will output similar amounts of heat. Ultimately, the data center's cooling system must remove the heat regardless of where it is generated. Further, recent studies suggest that disks themselves are less susceptible to heat than originally thought [39] . This, combined with the more recent emphasis on data-intensive computing [31] , suggests that next-generation supercomputers may require local storage despite the possibility of increased failures.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We have shown that it is possible to effectively checkpoint MPI applications using the LAM/MPI implementation with low overhead. Previous checkpointing implementations have typically neglected the issue of checkpoint storage. We comprehensively addressed this issue with a comparison against all major storage techniques, including SANbased strategies and commercial parallel file systems. Our replication implementation has proven to be highly effective and resilient to node failures.
Further, we showed that our replication strategy is highly scalable. Where previous work discussed within the literature typically tests scalability up to 16 nodes, we have demonstrated low overhead up to 256 nodes with more realistic checkpoint image sizes of 1 Gbyte per node. Our work enables more effective use of resources without reliance on network storage and is able to take advantage of additional network availability (such as Myrinet or additional Ethernet networks) to further reduce the overhead of checkpoint replication. We hope to extend this work to provide support for additional network interconnects, such as InfiniBand and Myrinet, using their native interfaces rather than IP. We believe that this will result in further increases in performance. Finally, we showed that our local storage/replication solution is far less expensive than a dedicated checkpointing backplane, costing as little as 25 percent of a SAN-based solution.
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